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Revolution in iiunqcrnl -
I and the 
1 
[ Crisis of  Stalinism 
/ P I O N E E R  P U B L I S H E R S .  

The Hungarian Revulution 
and the Crisis of St "qim 
-.dopkd by the N a t W  M k r d  the 
S d d M  W o r k n  P&y at ita m d h g ,  Jan. 84,1BS7. 
The Hungarian and Polhh revolutim have again den+ 
~ ~ 8 t F l r t e d  the leading role of the wmkhg &ma h t h m  
 omt ti on of mciety from capitalhim to noeirjiam. 
The world struggle for socialism, which has ertgerieraoed 
a rapid meleration since World War I11, hrse m w  k m  
thrust forward with renewed mer* 
The Hungarian and Polk& event. have confirmed the 
view taken faat April by the Hatiowl Committee of the 
Stx ia t  Workem Party that a new &age has opened in 
the Rmian  mvoIution. The mortal crisis of Stalinism, 
which kame manifest at the Twentieth Congmss of the 
ammunist Party of the Soviet Union, waa interpreted by 
the Committee aa a sign of the intensity' df the mase 
unrest and preaure, b t h  in the Soviet Union and in the 
k t  European countries dominated by the Kremlin bu- 
reaucmcy. The deve~menta  in Hungary and m d ,  
which .bhoght tha mums into the polltid arena on a 
nation-wide d e  arsd UfW tha ~truggls to a Mgba level, 
nrrw make it possible to draw new and important mclu- 
eIons regarding the further of Ithe d d h  agong of 
Shl inkm trnd the rebirth of revdaticwary mcWm WI r 
mass movtnient. 
The general reasons for the renewed motion of the 
zmmes in the Soviet Union and .Eamtem Eprope were 
explained h the April resolution of the Natiollal Commit- 
tee of the SWP aa follows: 
The victory d the Soviet Unwn in World War If, due 
prbmdy to the planned economy, a I M  the relatim of 
world fmxa tO the diaadvanhge of c~pitabm. The a- 
pmmion of the soviet union' into Ewbm Etlmpe broke 
t h e ~ t i o ~ t h a t h a d f ~ t h e g m w t h d t h e ~ t f c  
ash in the Soviet Union. The vicbry of the X ~ V  
and Chinese revoIutiom ended the long & of ddeab 
of molutI01zs which had further s-ensd 8tdidmm 
The mmted revolutionary upsiurgei~ in the colonid mrld 
d a d  world impmidiam etin more and added to the 
fotees faw* rebirth of mohtionary m c i d h  as a 
mas movement. Within the Soviet Union the unpar- 
dew rate of expamion of the means of production, 
again due primarily ta the phnned economy, i d m g I y  
shifted w i a l  relations in favor of the growing prole- 
tariat. Russia's b a c h r d n m ,  another source of SUnIert 
atrexlgth, began to give way with the advance of technol- 
ogy and education. The Soviet Union. moving ahead of 
the West European powers, even broke ArnerWs mon- 
opoly in atomic energy. These happenings undermined 
the foundations of Stalinism. a change that was .bound+to 
become reflected sooner or later in the minds of ~e 
rn- of the Soviet orbit. 
Thm, as TM&y long ago f-w, the - of 
Blanatd economy at home and the adv- mf tdta re.volu- 
tion abroad sharpened the hi& ~ o n h d i c d h  of 
Soviet d t t y ,  bringing t h m  to explaslvt mtid ex- 
p~esslon against the ~~ rtgime of the bureau- 
atit digamhy that usurped power fdlowing the death 
of LtlrJn. 
The pmt-Stalin poky of gmnting come~sions to the 
ma#- and correcting the moat monstrous abuses w a  
evidence that Stah'a heim recognized the gathering re- 
aistmce to their rule. But contrary to the ex~&Narr  
of the -in the CQ-~~IW raked the revolutlomry 
spirit of the masses and brought them cloaer to open re- 
volt. Thc first evidence of this was a widapread atrike 
movement in Ertstern Europe that culminated in the u p  
rising of the East German workem in June 19fi3. Uae of 
violent repressive measures likewise did not halt the 
movement of the masses, for the East G t m n  uprising, 
put down by military force. inspired dramatic atrikes in 
the prison camps indde the Soviet Union. Tn consequqne 
of thL ferment. the Kremlin decided to go even further 
in granting legal and economic colice~eions. In an at- 
tempt to associate themselvesl with the popular h a w  of 
Stalinism. the top bureaucracy under Khrushchev's lead- 
emhip at the Twentieth Congress opened an attack on 
the S&lh cult and raiaed the slogan af 9 a c k  b Lenia" i 
.. 'Thk aet in motion forces that will inevitably paw 
beyond the control of the humwracy,?. the April m l u -  
,&n d e c l d ; .  "for the Congress pronouncements on 
8Win will W m e  a banner for'the misees in marching 
fornard . to completely ' cIeanae the Soviet Union of the 
hated Stalinist syatem. It legalizes their demand for an 
end to Stalinism and a return to Lenia. They will know 
how to put this significant conm&sion ta full advantage. 
The Congress thuts marks' the beginning of a new, prol 
foundly revolutionary stage in the Soviet Unwn." 
. .  The correctness of thh estimate was q~ickb COV- 
f h e d .  On June 28 the workem of Poaqn, Poland, went 
out on a general strike that grew into an uprising. Their 
action was aymptmmtie of the pcipuirrr urge to extend the 
concerrsions made by the bureaucfacy and to convert the 
paper promises about a return t o - h n i n  into living realits. 
Id a "W~RefannW Movement 
The palZk bi events m a  much the =me as in the 
East German uprising three years before. The wdwm' 
8-1e began with economfc demands; and, in face 'of 
mistance f m n  the -@me, was converkd into a political 
uprbing, culminating in the d e m d  for the withdrawal 
of M e t  troops; that is, frmbrn from the grip of the 
Kremlin bureaucracy. At firet the Poliih Stalinist leadere 
Wed like their East German counterpa-. They sland- 
ered the rebelliotler workera as "fascist" agenb and their 
Pebellioug sctions a "imperialat-inspired:' As in Ehst 
Germany they relied primarily upon the Soviet Army with 
ita tanks to cmsh the upriairtg. , 
.* , . 
Despite the tough line of the PCremlin, fresh conces- 
&lorn, much more extensive than in the of East Ger- 
many, were won in Poiand. Stalin'a frame-up system hav- 
W #been renounced by Ehrushchev the trials of partic- 
ipants in the uprising could not be converted into frame- 
uw ltnd window dressing for a mass purge. Instead, the 
defendants were able to xeveal in open court how the 
police had tortured them .into "confe~ions" fokwing ar- 
rest; they were able to voice their feelings ah i t  the con- 
ditions that had driven them to revlolt, Some were f r d  
and othera given relativeIy light sentences. The nation- 
wide supgort of the P-n uprising fmed the regime to 
acknowledge that the Pmnan workers had 
and that they had just grievances. 
This mtrdat om the part of the Pa 
mot wideme d my Stalinist H s e l f - r e f ~ n  IC was 
cafsioned by fear that the Pman events might twch off 
n general mlutionarg eonflagration that could spread 
thpaghollt hatem Eumpe and into the Soviet Union It- 
I elf. Tbe Stalinht bweadmts decided to make d e r  
public display of antidtalidsm and deal gentIy with the 
h e m  of P m m .  But the mcessions following the Pos- 
nan uprising represented a significant gain by the f o b h  
wu&ers, a by-product of their revolutionary struggle, 
md it inspZmd them to press for more. 
In a bold move, the Ieadertship of the Polish Com- 
munist Party d e m  the Kremlin proconsul Rokomv- 
nky. They rephed him on October 21 with Gornulka, a 
popular symbol of resiatame to M O S C O ~ B  rule ~ ~ ~ X U B B  of 
his long yema of imprisonment on charma of "Titoism." 
Gomulka demanded a greater measure of independence 
from Mwcow. while the workm began mobillzing for a 
stmggIe. Stslin's heirs, including the tap genemh, flew 
to Warsaw to put pressure on the new government. C+ 
mulZra responded by keeping the armed Polbh workem 
Informed of the hour--hour developments. Minor clash- 
ea occurred between Soviet and Polish troop. In face of 
this Wstance, which marked the high point to date In 
the Polish revolution, Khmhchev and Co. backed down, 
but on their return to Moseow they began mobilizing 
trww on the brdm of Poland. 
The outbreak of the Hungarian revolution cut acm~ I these developments. If Stalin's heirs had thought pf R- 
%OW to force in Poland, the experience in H u m  
e?mnged their minds. They made their peace with the 
Gomalka mgime, granting new and significant conmi- 
doma although thwe are far from meetiig the demand 
of the Polish workem for independence and eqmlfW in 
a free assodation of the &tern Ehmpem cotmtrie8, the 
80.trfet Union and the People8 Republic of C h k  - 
gatbering fresh power for the next adwce along the lPad 
of palltical mvolatim. 
In Hungary the pattern visible in the East Geman 
and Poznan events appeared again, bat on a greatly mag- 
nified atale. Much that was prevlougly implidt now be- 
came explicit, above all the power of the working daas 
and the forms its struggle tends to take against the bu- 
reaucracy. Just as the preceding upridnga were previews 
of the Hungarian revolution, so the Hungarian revolution 
is a preview of the coming struggle in the Soviet Union, 
a struggle in which we can confidently expect the appear- 
ance of what was lacking in the Hungarian revolution - 
a revolutionary socialist party capable of guaranteeing 
Buccess. 
The Hungarian revolution was inspired by the October 
21 ~uccess of the Palish worker8 in ousting Rokosmvaky 
and putting Gomulka in power in Warsaw. On the follow- 
Ing day, October 22, students and intellectuals in Buda- 
pest, most of them membem of the Communist Party, 
strrged meetings demanding the restoration of Nagy to the 
&emhip and.the withdraw4 of Soviet occupation troops. 
The next day, October 28, p a r d  beg&. Demonstrators 
appeared at the Budapest radio station to ask that their 
demands be broadcast. Security police gave a typic81 Stalin- 
ist answer. They arrested the delegation. As the m 8 e d  
crowd moved forward, the pdice opened fire. This touched 
off the revolution. 
Bdmequent developments o(wvtnIe21tIy be divided 
into three ~itages: (1) the Nagy regime rrnd the armed 
aprisinga; (2) the cmdahg d both t b  Nagy reg3me and 
the armed np-; (3) the struggle between the Kdar 
regime and the Workem Cbuacb. 
(1) In face of the f ighti i  in the streets, the hated 
Gero government swght b combine conwsiona with 
repremive actton. On the one hand, it h t d l e d  Nugy mi 
Premier ; oq thd other, it invited Hmht occupation trbops 
into Budapest to gut down the demonstratom. Thb was in 
aemdance with the general policy followed by Stalin's 
heirs t r h  the dIetatois death. 
Nagy  st fimt cokborated with Gero, He called on the 
insurgent people to diaprse. But as Soviet tankdl began 
rolling into Budapest October 24, the tnaam todr up am18 
in nelfdefeme, spearheading the pla~ls inawmctfan. Nagy 
mponded with sgpeah to lay &wn amti sumndw 
on the pmmise of amnesty. 
T h e r e f ~ o b t h e H r m g a r B a n w  toahh.um* 
fidenee In Nagy dem-taa Mmt thcrg tmdd m onc 
in the pliii&l arena but, t h ~ l v a s s  mfs ia ths *k 
~ ~ f p o p ~ t ; B V d C Z f i O &  
Three more e p d y  &nifiwt thhm happened - 
the Hungarian army went over to the revolutionists, the 
Soviet troope began manifeating -pathy with Wir 
cause, and on October 25 the workira launched e gemd 
etlike. 
Most important, the mawm began orgaddug fhrrm- 
e l v e ~ .  Councils - organs of workem' power -- a m  
on a natiomide d e  fn the factories, the arny ud 
neighborhod areas. Dud power thw amw on the fopadrc 
tiom of =Mized property. Although capitalkt r e e h  
tionist elements maneuvered for advan- 
in government, they wem an hdgnkfknt f a  iu
h s t  to the working clam d# ita allla. The w o r k $  
proved that in a moIutiomrg they # em& 
all attempts at capiut restoration jPBf 8% they wold 
Meat  the native SWWt b m e a u ~ ,  steering the pH- 
tical revolution on itrm true mume toward the ehblish- 
ment of workers democraq. It wan to p-e bureau- 
cratic rule that. the Kmdh intemened in Hangary, wing 
the p m n c e  of reahrationkt elementa as a pM& fbr 
its brutal waault on the working clgss, 
f t l L h s a ~ o t r r s v o l a t b m w ~ g u t y , t h e  
W h  C O P W ~  lacked the deu b k a h i p  and the c b r  
ddamtion oi aims that w d d  have 41 the'- 
u n q u k d f m t h e b s g i a n i n e . N ~ . I I t b s a ~  
ablt evid- shows that the dam, wM& wm 
t h a d ~ ~ , w a a ~ o a d d s n d I n g t h e r r o d a l ~  
q- -9 adl ied,  mth aa the planned -1 
t h a L i t W d d ~ t o ~ m m y * t t e n r p t b ~ t o t b R  
~ O i t B s f s a d s m i t h r d ~ ~ m d m r H a r t b y  
a d  under the Naads, that ibmwreaaatwauhtk&am= 
~ o P p o l i i l e a l ~ u ~  that h,tJseb@Idhgdad- 
arestrtsfrecdfhm the-tic-dSb 
l i l a g l l _ 1 ; I 1 t e r e v t n t u ~ s d b t t h e ~ g a v a ~  
~pathpandev~dlrsctsPpgorttetheworksra 
The M o m w  bureaucmb were aware that a success- 
fuI workem mdution in Hungary w& immedFaMy 
weep the W e r n  into the mt of Enstern Empe 
and fnto the &deb Unim They realized that the revolu- 
t i o n ~  forces were beyond control by N w  or m y  other 
M&W of the native Hungarian ~ U F B B ~ C ~ .  The masses 
had taken m a k  inb their own hands, were exercising 
their mereign will, and had begun the procesht of ele- 
vating a complebly new leademhip out of their own in- 
surgent ranks. Moscow, therefore, prepared to abandon 
the Nagy regime and mort %o Soviet tanks as they bad 
in the case of East Gsrmany and Pmnan. 
On .October 26, just thee days after being c+ophd 
inh office, Nagy a n m u d  formation of a new "peoples 
front'' government that would include leaders of former 
peamt parties. He abolished d=t ivht ion  of the land, 
promised free elections and a 'gmultf-party'* state. On 
October 29 he demanded the withdrawal of Soviet tmpb! 
from Budapeet. However, when reinforced Soviet troops 
amin moved toward Budapest November 1, Nagy repudi- 
ated the Warsaw pa&, decked Hungarian neutrality and 
appe%Ied to the United Nations for guarantees and de- 
fense. 
In a showdowp crisie, thh  typical Stalinist bureau- 
mt showed hia fears bbth of the rank and file of the 
Communist Party and of the working-claps fighters on 
the Wcadea. He mught support among capitalist reato- 
ratkmist elements and their foreign imperialist backers. 
Nagy'er courae phyed directly into the hands of world im- 
perialiam which had already been seeking t o  convert the 
turmoil to its own advantage by picturing the =volt 
a g h t  Stalinim ss a revolt against the planned econ- 
omy of Hungary. It made such counter-revolutionary fig- 
uma as Cardinal Mindamnty appear to the outaide world 
to have much greeter weight than they actunlly powessed. 
For a time it confused the picture enough so that in the 
a h n m  of s revolutionary rrocialiat party it could a m  
that the aims of the revolution itself were those implicit 
in the politia of Nagy. 
Abve  all, Nagy'a announcements and actions gave 
invaluable material to the Stalinist propaganda machh, 
which, as in the case of Eastern Germany and Po~lan, 
sIandwed the Hungarb revolution aa "fascis&'* "impe- 
,r£&list-inspired," and s reveraion to "Horthyism." 
9 
T h  h t h  B thqt I1 y~;s,afteF@m&qgphn 
w&ma webmed the Soviet forces as @e@ts $ Icountry. Moscow's power ltay a t t e r n  in Ef-* ,% 
pugpet Nagy regime wras hm between the kt 
fore~s  and -the proletarisn revolutioa. The- 
Party of 800,M me-rs had suffered an interad ex- 
pWa, v W d y  the enth rank and Pile a d  the lower 
atrattun 6f the appamtua going over to the cause of the 
working class. The workem, tqWher with the atudentsJ, 
i n t e k d d s  and the Bungarfan army, were h f d d  
mvdi aad the pemmtrt began impplying them with food. 
Workers Councils hd appeared on a n a t i d  scale and 
Id kgm to formulate revoluthuq demand& Tbeae of- 
f& powerful amfirmation of the vttlldity of the pro- 
gram d pditid pdut ion  agginst the StalInbt bureau. 
cmq k g  advcmted by world W y h  
(2) Shlin'ts heire had already made their decision. 
The second atage of the Hungarian revolution apeaed on 
November 4, three days before the thirty-nirwth anoiver- 
ww!y of the 1917 Russian revolution. Abt part of the Nagy 
govmment, lured into a trap by a p r o w  of nmtia- 
tiona, ware placed under arrest, Macow ordered the over- 
whelming militam forces that had b&n concentrated d w  
Ing the previous week on Huhgmy'a frontier8 h move on 
Budapest. Thw troops, npearhded by mme 6,000 tanks, 
8ppeW to have been =refully selected from -among the 
mt bdmard ;sections of the Soviet armed forces. They 
had been lied b? being told that #their taak was to defend 
Hungary again& a bourgeois counhr-revolution inmired 
by American imperialism, 
h Qidl of ibe Paris Cornnone 
The blood bath began Once and far all, 8htirrP# heim 
demomkated the idiocy of any belief in the psssibilik 
of their "self-reform." They ahowed in the harshest way 
m i b I e  the correctness of h t s k y ' s  view that they re- 
d l e  a ruling ckss in the tenacity with which Chey ding 
to power and the special privileges it aasuPes, 
What was remarkable was the heroic resistance of 
the HangtLFian people, headed by the working dad, in thk 
unequal military conkst. Their erpirit ww that of the 
P d s  Commune which ~erved to inspire genentiom of 
~ ~ n r s  workers. Though ovemhelmed by vastly 
superior military force, the workers did not end their 
political resltance. They refuwl to accept the K a b  
regime that Mde into power on M e t  tanks. 
(3) me t h h l  stage of the E d  revolatlon ie 
extraordinarily imtractive. All the' Pigurea of the N&gy 
regime vanished from the scene; aome of them in Stalin- 
ist hands yere eithet h o t  or imprisoned; some took mf- 
uge abroad; Nagy himelf b k  a a u m  in the Yugodav 
Embusy only to be later tricked into capture by the Stalh- 
iat invaders. The weight of the mtorationht elemenb 
that participated in the revolution for their own reaction- 
ary ends turned out t o  be in inverse proportion to the 
noise they inspired in the capitalist press abroad. The 
real power proved to be with the working class. organized 
in Workers Councils. 
Backed though it is by the inight of the world's 
greatest army, the ajrrogant Kadar regime fin& itself 
forced nevertheleas to deal in all questions pertaining to 
the rule of the cowltqr with the very antagonist it sought 
to  crush, the H u w a r h  workers. The workers won thb 
psition by refadng to place wnfidence anywhere except 
in their own elected Workers Councils. 
The blml bath - to the consternation of the Hrem- 
Iin. we may be sure - failed to prostrate the working 
class or t o  drown ib Workers Councils. The new leader-. 
ship of the Hungarian workers, born in struggle only r 
few weeks before, continued the general &rile, continued 
' 
to hold meetings, to Issue militant leafleh, to protest the 
arrests and deportations, to organize new mass dehon- 
stratiow, and to repea* the demands which the workem 
had' mised in the eaxly daJra of the revolution -- with- 
drawal of Soviet troops and the institution of workers 
demoeracy. The central: demand of the general strike wag 
for legal recognition of the Workers Council8 as m- 
nent political Wim with sole authority in the ma- 
ment of indugtry. 
The role of the Workem lcouacils after the mnsd 
conflict was over demonatmted in the most convincing 
way that the gadar regime has no h e  of support the 
populace whatsoever. A11 the Stahiat propaganda about 
saving Hungary from "fascism" is t h u  shorn of the 
elightest shred of plausibility. Moscow's Feal target, aa 
the whole world can am in the reIation .between the Kadar 
nbgime rind the 'Cl'orkers Councils. turned out to IM the 
~ g h l l b u a  Hungo~iun workera, 
h.. - . 
The capacity of the Workers Councik In  lrm~tain 
Ihemsielrm in 
is a 1- fha 
4~ut the ,Ynviet 
fa& of the worst miIitary and police i emr  
1 will not be I d  upon the worken through- 
bloc. The Hungarian workers made a pri- 
1e.w dimvery in the mame of their ~trugple - Ihey 
discovered the form through which the political revolu- 
m 
tion against the Stalinist bureaucmcy will be organized. 
The form is the same a~ that previously used hy the R w  
sian workers h 1905 and 1917 against Czarism - Snvlet~ 
or Workere Councils, This form provide8 an arena in which 
a revolutionary party can develop wi i h extrmdinary 
speed. 
Whatever the immediate fate of the Hungarian Work- 
ers Councila. they will undoubtedly pmve to be the great- 
est single contribution made by the Hungarian workem 
to the political revolution in the Soviet sphere that will: 
finally accomplish the aim they have so courageously and 
brilliantly advanced. 
The Heed for a Marxist Parly 
The absence of a revolutionary socialist party was 
m.stly to the Hungarian workers. This is not to say that 
they can be held responsible for its absence. As experience 
has shown, it is not easy to build ~uch  a party under 
the tutalitarian rule of Stalinism. b k h g  conscious revci- 
lutionary-mialist leademhip, the Workers Councils failed . 
to assert their power. They continued to negotiate for 
cowesaions from MOE~COW'S puppets. This groved dims- 
trous. While the leadership of the Workere Councila wast- 
ed time in futile negotiations with figures who had no real 
power within the country, the Stalinist counter-revolution 
mobilized its repressive forces. 
(a) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to 
proclaim clearly the aims of the revolution: nation@ free- 
dom and workers' democracy ; the overthrow of the bureau- 
cratic a t e  and the vesting of power in the Workers 
Councils. 
(b) The leadership of the Workers Couneb fded to 
systematically issue revolutionary appeal8 to the workem 
of a11 Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, explaining 
the aims of the rekolution and asking for socialist eoI ik-  
ity in the common struggle. 
(c) The leademhip of the Workers Councils failed 
to sydematicallg appeal to the Soviet forcerr, reminding 
them of their heritage in the 1917 revolution. of their 
socialist convictiom, and of their own deep-seated griev- 
ances against the Kremlin. 
(d) The leadership of the Workers CounciIs failed to 
turn toward the workem in the capitalist countries for 
help in preventing the imperialists from taking advan- 
tage of the situation. 
(e) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed 
to amuse every metion of the populace to its stake in the 
victory and failed to mobilize the nation for all-out mili- 
tary defense. 
(f) The leadership of the Workers Cbuncils made a 
fatal mhtake in taking for good coin the promises of 
the Moscow bureaucrats to reform and to end the occu- 
pation. 
(g )  The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to 
anticipate Moscow's readiness to drown the revolution 
in bIood and were therefore caught by eurpk*iee when the 
eounter-rerolu tiomry R t tack came. 
Had the Workers Councils amertd their power. as 
they would have under a revolutionary-wia1Lt leader- 
ship, this would hare signified the doom of the 1Io~irow 
bureaucracy. for their political appeals and resolute ae- 
tions at the head of the revoiutiom would hare resounded 
through the length and breadth of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, bringing the masses to their feet with 
the b!azing mn~icfion that this marked the refurn t o  
Lenin, the regeneration of the workers siate. 
The Hungarian revolution has already done much to 
assemble. within the IVorkera Councils and amonR the 
revolutionary students and soldiers, the cadres-of a re$-o- 
lutionary socklist party. No other interpretation is pos- 
sible of the breaking apart of the Hungarian Communist 
Party and of the refusal of the Hungarian workers t o  
place confidence in either the Nagy or Kadar regimes. 
On top of this, the appeamnce of Workers Councils as 
the organized f o m  of the political revoIution demonatratee 
the readiness of the Hungarian workers to seek out and 
build adequate forms of political expression. The most 
necessary of all is the party, which brings conecioudl lead- 
ership to its highest expression. How bright the p a -  
pects are fur the rise 'of a mvoldfb~-mdd&itf PlIVtJT 
among the workers of the .Soviet blw a' be judged from 
mamy of the ~ l a a n a  that appeared in the Htmjwian ma- 
lWon These alogana were the producta of thirikimg 
minds, who. perhaps without even Ifnowing it as yet, came 
to Trotskyist conclurrions. 
In opposition to this heartening tendency, it iai now 
clear that the Soviet bureaucracy is shifting toward re- 
liame on the armed forces as the main Instrument af its 
rule. We now have three instances in which the principal 
means of repreasioli was the army - Faatern -, 
Panan, and Hungary. This signifies increasing impor- 
tance for the generda in the top bureaucracy, a ~ea~tiom 
IVJT development. As Trotsky foresaw, a shift by the bu- 
reaucracy away from reliance on the secret political po- 
lice has been accompanied by an increasingly reprwive 
role for the army. The exhaustion of the efficacy of police 
terror ha8 brought Stalin's heirs to the we of biks and 
machine guns. 
This expedient, however, will not mve the burem- 
cracy. The social composition of the Soviet armed f& 
corrgsgonds far more closely ta that of ,the country as a 
whale than the secret political police. It is far more vub 
W l e  to .revolutionary wnbgIon than the police, rrrr all 
experience testifies, including the latest experience In 
Hungary. Moreover, the new climate in the Soviet Union, 
the maaa u n m t  and desire for change, has ita refl- 
in the armed forces. Already, far and wide moag the 
&YM d i e m ,  we m y  be sure, the stury oi the -1 
letting in Hungary b mdng wrtath and reddm agaht  
S&'B heha Finally, even if the Soviet military dmdd 
prove miid m g h  to be used in amther or Em= 
gary, the entrance of the Soviet p r o I e W t  on the mesa 
M N t i d  revolution wJIl speedily win aver the ranks of 
the army and disin-tr the Kremlhk -ve pwm. 
Why has Eastern Europe rather than the Soviet 
Union become the scene of the first major revohthnary 
wul t  against the Stalinist dictatarship? 
hlim CMd Economic Growlh 
Co~itrary to the boasts of Stalinist prqxqmda, d l -  
ism has not been under construction in Eastern Europe. 
1t is true that the preliminary steps were taken by bureau- 
cmtic-military maxu after promulgation of the Truman 
Doctrine. The Mlorda and capitalists were expropriated 
and' planned economy was introduced. Although t h ~  
measurea brought economic p r o m  to Eastern Europe, 
they were at the same time u t M  to serve the interests 
of the Kremlin bureaucracy at the expense of fistern 
Europe. Had the economies of these countries Been in- 
tegrated through a gened plan on an equal basis with 
that of the Soviet Union, and had they ,been fitted together 
hi an Easterp European Socialist Fedemtion, there might 
have been gome truth in the contention that them eoun- 
trim were moving toward sochiliam. 
However, the fact t that the Kremlin a r b i t f l y  kept 
each coantry k k e d  within its national f r o n t h  and itfl 
@carny just as arbitrarily belred ta that of the W e t  
Unfon. The economic polieiei imposed by  bureaucratic 
decree undermined the living standards and working m- 
d I k  of the masmi. The exphitatton ef these mtr i ea  
has thus been analogoms to that of iaaperidiat exploitath 
of dwial b d a  This alone tends to give an added revolu- 
tionary impulsion to the workers of Ea~tern Europe. 
Moreover, the workere have revolutionary traditions, in- 
duding a record of W i a t  struggle under fascist or 
mi-faadat reghem. The- traditions are continuaIly 
m i t a u  by the mem fact of living under a fpreign rule 
of totalitarian chmackr. To this mwt be added the 
premure of the peasanby who are aware of the post-war 
recovery .in the neighboring  land^ of Weatern Eumpe and 
see no reasor! why they ahould not have a better atan'dard 
of living. 
The same factma that made Eastern Empe the 
Initial arena of the political revolution dm detemhed its 
initia~ form. The Hungarian revohtion took f ie  form of a 
nationaI uprising againat the Eremlin bureaucracy. It 
placed national independence - the withdrawal of Hoviet 
m y b g  troops - at the head of the list of demands. 
Freedom from Kremlin control b essential to the creation 
of autonornow worlcing*lw ormnhtiom. It is also 
essential tr, the reviaion of economic planning in. favor of 
the workers. 
By placing itself at the head of the national inde- 
pendence strug&, the wo~king clam was able t o  make a 
firm alliance with other strata of the populace - asp&Ily 
the pewantry. Indeed, it is onIy under the leadership of 
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the working class that the century-old mtiod p b l e m  
of Eaatern Europe can be solved and the brash laid for 
~01~11tars assciation of each national unit in a broader 
&list federation of nations. 
The bureaucratic-military way in which the property 
overturn b k  place in Eastern Europe cmted  an addi- 
tional problem in barring the masses from making a clean 
weep of the old propertied classes. 
In Hungary, these burgeois elements appeared in the 
national independence movement, hoping to steer it back 
to capitalism. The triumph of the Hungarian revolution 
against the Kremlin would have cleared the field for a 
hawe between the Workers Councils and these restora- 
tionist forces. Proof of this can be gathexed from the fact 
that many Workers Councils were aware from the begin- 
ning of the restorationkt danger and ~ounded the alert. 
The advantage in th& struggle would have been on 
the side of the working clasg. The weight of the wo- 
ctass organized in ite Councib and in emerging independent 
uniona ; the mialiaed property foundations aamcfated with 
mrkiiIclass power; the a m m e n t  of the w o r k e ~  to 
these foundations; the dear aigna of mlutionarg work- 
ing- ferment thmughout the Sodet orbit; the gmw- 
ing weaknem of world capitabm and its lack of appeal 
for the mss;ses - all thaw favored a mislkt vicbxy* A 
apitsliat restoration is mnceivable only thmgh the 
crushing of the organized fame of the working W by 
imperialism. Thi8 ie excluded at pre#nt because the world 
relatiomhip of foxes ia unfavomble to 0sah an imperhbt 
adventure. 
Capitalid Reaction Stnngihwd 
The Eremb'~ reprdve  yztr against the H-
w ~ d a s s c a n b e v i e w e d d y ~ ~ l a n a a d t o c h ~ ~  
mbmthm if it ahorrld wenilrally be at-pted. The 
aim is to atomize the working class aad exdudt it 
from c m t d  of hddry .  A EremlCn v k h y  thtia frcSUtateS 
a primary task ot the capitali& emater-~ovdtion. 
A comllary to the unfinished atruggle against &e 
bourgeois drat ioniata  is the pmblem of politid in- 
etitutione. In every country of Ea~tern Europe, the gFem- 
lin retained the framework of the old capitalat p d b  
menta The governments of Eaatern Eumw rue all tech- 
a i d y  '"popular fKrnbP' baed on the parliarnen~ 
system. The politid revolution in ewh of the Etwt E m  
pmn countries posea, therefom, the needa ta replace the 
parliamentary form by the Soviet form of rule. The 
parliamentary form offers the most favomb1e o g p o ~ t y  
for Stalinist bureaucrats and capitakt restorationl8ta to 
check the revolutionary drive d the mrking c h .  The 
completion of the political revolution requires the elimina- 
tion of this relic of the capitalist ordw. 
The national character of the H-jagdan revdution 
split the native burestucracy into a wing that was totally 
au'bservient to the Kremlin (the Rakosi-Gem wing, sub 
sequently headed by Kadm) and another wing that sought 
to head off the revolutionary developments by ~bnding 
at the head of the maas movement (Nagg). The worker- 
CP members meanwhile took their place in the ins- 
tionary ranka of the working b e ,  and h many key a- 
stood at the head of the revolution, playing imporbt 
roles in creating arad lading the Workera Councils. 
Nagy ategped forward aa the mkesmm and defender 
of the bureaucratic caste. Eb sihohlived regime waa 
baaed on the deformed workers' state, but in seeking allies 
against both the masme and the Kremlin, it became a 
pint of infiltration for mtonrtiodst elements. They 
favored the Nagp regime becaw its p d c h  - a com- 
bination of the 8tabiat popular-front program initiated 
by Nagy and the pro-Western orientation of the bowgmb, 
petty-bourgeois and Social Dm-tk potiticiana - would 
have immensely facilitated imparialist miIihy interven- 
tion or an evenha1 reactionary coup d ' e M  
The rise in m ~ l u t i o ~  potentid in the Soviet bloc: 
ie visible in the d m t i n g  tempo of events. From E a t  
Germ#y to Pumaq three yeam elapsed. k o m  
to the Polbh victory, 1- than four nwntha. Fmm the 
Polish defiance of Moscow to the Hungarian repolation, 
two days. The* savage use of military force in Hungary 
w.U check the movemmh for a time, but ae the leamna 
of the even& rue ahrbed, a new dm shovld occur of 
even grate9 power, The autagonim between the maswm 
trnd the burwrucmtic cash remaina sxplmive. The queation 
now is whether the bureaucracy can find o new equilibrium 
in its relationa with the re- peopIes. 
The political cost b the gremlin of putting down the 
17 
H ~ I I  workera by armed force hEla created a crisis 4 
Soviet poliey. The conceaaions grranted the G o m u h  reghe 
in Pdand are nufficient evidence of mbering second 
thoughts on the efficucy of military violence The notion 
of some bouqgmie cornmaahbra that the suppression of 
the Hungarian revolution aIgnaIe a thange by the Kremlin 
to exchsive reliance on repressive measures is wrong. 
The Kremlin will find itself compeHed to grant new can- 
cessions. Rewlatiwary stmggleg win condons  and 
reforms as by-products This holds true for the Hungarian 
redation as in tbe cage of any other sirnilat struggk 
But new eonmssione will only pmvide fresh fuel for the 
firm of revolution. The Soviet bureaucracy is 6hw cangbt 
in a dilemma from which there k no & t c q x ~  It happens 
to be their destiny to preside over the death agony of 
Stalinism.. 
The repercussions of the Hung~rian revolution were 
world-wide. One reason for the enormous publlcib was 
the tender solicitude the imlperialist powers showed for 
.the fate of the Hungarian people as Britain and France 
launched their blitzkrieg on Egypt. As always, the guar 
d i m s  of the capitalist system sought t o  take advantage 
of this fresh crime of Stalinism, utilizing it tb smear the 
idea and program of socialism ; and the Kremlin butchers 
did much to faoilitate the imperialist objectives. 
The Eisenhower administration repeated the p a t h  
it followed in the &st German uprtiw, at f h t  posing 
as the patron saint of the rebels and then permitting its 
ardor to flag as the class chmacter of the revolutionary 
upsurge became clear, In East Germany, Ddles' benevolent 
in-t in the uprising reached its high point in the 
Packages from Eisenhower campaign. In the case of Hun- 
-, the State Department had to go further, admitting 
token numkrs of refugee immigrants from the atrife- 
torn country. It waa noteworthy that aa the weaknew of 
.the War regime and the strength of the Workera 
ei16 k a m e  d f e s t ,  the excitement of the would-be 
kap@&t rr'beratom" over their pmipecb In the Htm 
g h  ievolution died down They advised again& amed 
uprisings. As in Emt Gemmy, they found a $endm 
worked revolution not to their liking even though 
directed against Stalinism. The maion for that h plain 
enough. "Libemtion*' through imperialhit intemention i i~  
one thing. Wwkmi mvolution ii a diffemnt matter. 
r ' J  ts '%th t he  h d c  Buwdan mbds I br nothihg tn amnia mfth the -tic$ tears ahed 
in the anitrrliat by the 3mperMIsts aa8 their 
agenb. -list &port af the EU- mvolution 
rests on furthdce  of the dam stnmle at -8. A 
militant worker in an An~erictrn plant who w m b  ta help 
the Hungarian fightera stands at opposite poles from the 
Big Busines8' publication that lseeks to convert Cardinal 
ltiindszenty into a new Horthy. After diacounthg the 
CathoI ic-inspired demonatmt ions and the capitafiat 
editorial rhetoric, the hard fact remain@ that lprolebrh 
sympathy for the Hungarian bid for freedom waa 
profound. Workers were stirred everywhere. The Staliaist 
bureauwacy, in their eyes, stood &credited as a m  
befow. 
The effect of the Hungarian events on the world-wide 
crisirg of StaIinism waa immediate and devastrtting. Al- 
ready pmhandly disturbed by the melationa about W n  
at the Twentieth Gong-, rank and file Comlnunistn 
gagged at the requmt ta awalbw the s u p p d o n  of the 
Hungarian revolution by Stah's heirs. Wasn't the 1h00b 
ing of H r m g w h  work ere^ evidence of the =me "paranoian 
that the la& dictator wasi d d  to have 8uffem3 from in 
the final d d e r r  of hb  rule? And how aphh the revolt 
in the firat.phe, a d d e  after "sochlkm" wwa hunched 
in Hungary and thme yeare after SWin was b i d  away? 
Large-scale resignations from Stalini8t organhatione 
occtmed on an 'internatiow. d e .  Rifts appeared in the 
lower ranks of the apparatus and prominent figurm who 
had long been in the Stalinist orbit moved away. . . . 
The major plan- of cleavage in world S b h s m  were 
described In the April resolution of fie Nat3onal Corn- 
mittee of the Socialist Workers Party as followa: In the 
top b m u m y  two main formations are apparent, an 
extreme right wing desirorma of making i h - m  with 
1 - k d  &pi&liam and an ossified grouping that ipl hope- 
lessly committed, as a venal agency of the Soviet bur- 
eaumcg, to defending eveming  that mma out of 
&scow. In the mnk and file d d e m b l e  &moralidion 
ia evident. Ranging from apathy to dwbta abut M s m  
itself, the main tendency fs to dmp into inacthie aud 
withdrrrw from politim. Howevcb, m m b w  am 
sseWngtheirwaytOflrmMaFlh3t*Thdrwilungn~ 
t o e W f m m h , t o e x a m b e t h e p ~ a ~ r a m s a a d f h d h g a o f  
other wark3ng-class pditieal -dendam 9a a h- fn- 
didion that the breaL-ui of Stabism larill h d  to a 
resargeaee of revo1ptiom~ 
This maly~is has been coflmed. The Hungarian 
events semed to speed up developments in the C o q u n i s t  
Parties along the lines predicted and to qrecipitab deci- 
sions that were still in the rnakiing. Mote is yet to come 
as the enormity of Mosco+s counter-revoIutionwry stand 
sinks in. 
The Hungarian revolution and its euppression added 
new issues to those already causing fissures in the 
Stalinist movement. First of all, fresh differences cropped 
up between Moscow and Belgrade. The Kremlin admitted 
" e m "  and "mistakes" in the paat in ETangary, which it 
blaqed on the Rakosi-Gero leadership, but argued that 
the use of Soviet troops in Hungary waa justified to save 
the country from "fawiarn." Tito blamed the Kremlin 
for the errors in Hungary and included as an "error" the 
first use of Soviet troops after Nagy took office. Tito 
especially scored the Krehdin for its slowness in carrying 
out promised reforma But he agreed that the Kremlin 
was right in wing troops the aecond time to smash the 
revolutiun&ry nprhi i .  
It is obviousIy in Tito's interest as head of Yugoslavia 
to favor greater independence for the Eashrn European 
countries now under Mwcuw'a domination. TO advance th.h 
aim he seeks pohts of sopport among the leaders in 
Moscow and in the Eastem European countries. It is jud 
as obviously in Tito'a interest aa head of the Yugoskv 
bureaucracy to side with SWlin's heirs in ~uppmwing a 
prdetrvian revolution which might leap across the 
Yugoslav border. Tito played a despicable role during the 
Hungarian revolution. He did not lift a finger to help the 
fighters and ended up by condemning and slandering 
them. When the arb were down, the fact ihat Tito 
mgmmnta simply a variety of Stalinism proved decisive - despite his differen- with Khrushchev & Co. Be- 
cause of his critid attitude and his reputation for 
independence, Tito'a argumenh in defense of Moscow 
wlere far more effective than anything that the out of 
Moscow iW. 
To the right of Tih ~tsmds the leadership of the French 
Communist Party which gratefully thanked Moscow for 
all the namerow Measings it brought Hungary. 
- 
~oatiauatioa of .llussiii Revolufiol 
To the left Ie the Gomnlka which autioua1g 
criticized the ''error$' of the KMnlin and just as 
t 
eautioualy, but significantly, refrained from justifying 
the use of Soviet tmps in Hungary. 
What atands out in the mmt gkhg  way is the 
~ m p l e  fact that in the eatire Stdidst movement not a 
dngle ~tstanding leader anywhen in the world tmk a 
stand in defense of the Hnngdan xevolntition. Not one! 
I. They simpIy repeated variations of the arguments ad- vanced by Mosmw and Belgrade. R would be difficult to 
y '  find more coadIneing prmf of the'deeay of the Stalinist 
bamumcy and the Iadr of m t y  in any policy based on 
the hope of their Af-refonn. 
The Hungarian revolution has revealed with crystal 
clarity the source of danger to the progres~ive socia1 
! structure of the Soviet Union and the East European 
, countries. The danger comes from world cagiuism on 
the one hand, and fmm the bureaucratk caste on the 
other. The evidene ia now concIu8ive that the revolution 
of the Hungarian workem is a continuation of the Ru% 
mian revoIution of October 1917. In their aspirations, their 
conscious program and their organized action, the Hun- 
garian workers are deepening and extending the mial 
conquests of the Elusslan R8V01ution and are striking 
powerful blows at the bureaucratic obstacle to its ex- 
tension. 
me H m g d a n  revduth Ja thus a H v h g  pnw,f of 
the 'Xk'otsskybt t h d  tibst the h a t  def- d the Smi@ 
Union hs the e-ion of the m d u t i i  The 
Elrmgarian revolation d t u t a a  thb type of defense in a 
double tsemw; it mka nnddmmy famm within the 
Sovist U n h  itsdi and at the mme time contributes 
enormouely to dearing the m y  for the revolutionary 
OV- oi tapitdim in tbu W d  
By its exmure of the counter-rqolutiomry nature 
of S M i n h  the HungaFian xevolutbn bas further dia- 
pigated the baneful influema of Staliniorm among the 
-list minded workere of the world. This has opened 
new possibilities for tbe mgmupment of the revolutionary 
vsnguard uudw the brrnner of 1;eniniam and Trohkyi~m. 
The New Stage in the 
Russian Revolution 
8edmtba adopted by a m e e t k  of the National Committea of 
the SoefpW W ~ t k t ~  h r t ~  LtM Aprfl 15-151 1966. 
A new stage has opened in the continuing development 
of the Rumian RevoIutioa The of the Soviet Union, 
who were politimfly expropriated by the bureaucracy 
under Stslin and who euffered i t ~  brutal rule fcr nearly 
three decadw are evidently once agdn in motion; they 
have already forced far-nwhhg concessions from the 
ruling burwsucracy and mom wm be -ted t o  fdh .  
The intermaticma1 repercwic1118, gmat as they are, hare 
d y  begpn. The m&eas of Trotsky's m a l e  against 
Stalinism b i i  to rapidly baome a b y  b e  among the 
rank of the Communist Partim ihvugbout the world. 
Stahism, the d obstacle in the path of the w o ~ k l  
revolution, fhcw its death wg k t  new pc&bWi& 
are now opening up f a  m a a a m M k  the world revolu- 
tioaary s o c i ~  mov-t on a new plane and ihua 
solving the "dsb of leadership" which lw paralyzed the 
revolutionary proletariat. This kt the meaning in M of 
the death MI of the Stdin cult eo- at the Twentieth 
of the Commrmht Party of the Soviet Udim 
EAST GERMANY AND VORKUTA 
After puttirsg Stalin'a aorgr~e otl disphy, the h i m  d 
the dictator attempted to d e  in Ma amme as high pffesta 
of the malt they had helped e&bbh. But this proved 
dmrblivd, To gain the time needed to cadidate  their 
h d t y  -me, they felt fad to m n t  actual eoxws&m 
Zo the mamee and to pmmise m. Thw imbed  prima- 
rily better living c d i t i w i  for the -kern and r mIaxa- 
tion af the plrge BY- The -dons, b e v ~ ,  m d  
to ha* the ma- who bad shady feat f m h  hope wia 
the W t h  of the foal who had mlsd the S d e t  
Union with b M  and tamr fop eoene three decadee. 
One d the m m q u m  w w  tb &trike moveam& 
t-houf the Swiet urnie of EastsFn firm. whfch 
culminatsd In the uprising of $he Eaet Geman workem in 
d#w1* TSrini-m-w * .h:wwl to 
, - Y e  &e$rh~H @uier tb Tit3 ''.rrrlfnf 'heel. 
-gut the cmwtrat3oe stkings were a p  
gaFent. The mciat, d-ttc ms the Mdka at Vorguta 
where %U,[HlO &ve laborer8 downed b l s .  These two 
eveblh, the h t  Geman wpriahg m d  the Vorkuta strike, 
frei%hhd the Kmdin. They revealed the m d  of the 
work- and the &by= separating the rtrlhg strata from 
a€? w* lnasws, 
CONCESSIONS TO WORKERS 
The mukt was the decfdm to Sva a really major 
conmion - nothing h than Stalin himself. This was 
doae at the Twentieth C m # m a ,  making it a h d m a r k  in 
Soviet history. 1n addition, other ~ - 3 i o n s  - genuine 
c o n d m  - were madg. Thme included the promlse of a 
ah& working day, aa inmmw in mchl benefits, better 
b d n g ,  an mil to la* didatorid rule, the rehabiliha- 
tiom d v h t t m s - M  up by SWh But the grsateart con- 
d o l l s  were the pmd80 to .mturn,to unhl and the 
deI ibeh de- d the ur#Wdb anatructed image 
of Stdin. nia set .in-nmfb f m s  that Mil inevitably 
pm beyond the P/ the h m a ~ y , ,  for the Cqn- 
gma q~ mlin win bemm a h n n w  fop 
the I- fn xm&* fopad coanpletely c l h w  the 
W e t  Union of the batmi St&lints;t arystem. It legalids 
their demand for an end to 8tdiniem and a return t o  
I 
-in. Tbeg: will h o w  how to put this .signHieant con- 
cmion to full adv-. The Congress thaa mark the 
b g h i n g  09 r new, prafouadly revdutimary atage in the 
Bmkt Union* 
T h e  immediate mum fra' tha mceshlions, as -we b e  
Wated WBB the palpable pressure of the masses wbicb 
hm grown ao grw~t th&t the bure4~um~Y calculates it 
d b simply by meping  purges m in tlie 
of W i n  - it mom @& to bead with the 
p m a u p 8 h ~ o f a ~ b e Q n O b r b B m  by it. 
The gm- m s n a ' m  within the Soviet Union 
h a of pmf'wpder dwelqunents. Mwt fm- 
~ o f ~ b t b e & i f % i n t h s ~  o i w o r l d ~ e r  
away f l ~ m   pitd dim. Tihe muhing of the Axis powers, 
I: 
mmmded by the extension d planned wonmy to 
F.mtem E-, warm a blow from whhh <the 'capitaliil 
amla. hm not been dde to racover. 
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' The trern-~ victory over German b#Whihm, 
srhies-ed despite Statin's crimes, wrved to inmire the 
Soviet wworking clam - already grown In eize a h  skills 
to .second in world importance - with new aelf-confidence. 
The incapacity of Amerian imperialism Eo rebuild Ger- 
man$ and Japan aa pom*erful military threats took away 
f~+c~rn the bureaucrucy the specter of invasion which it had 
nsetl for decades as a means of diverting attention from 
itself lmrl m u r i n g  sullen submission to its dictatorial rule. 
The post-war wave of revolution md upridwa that swept 
thruuglb the colnllial world, above all in Chins where the 
matest victory since 1917 was registered, began to 
catalyze rex*olutionary moods amohg the Soviet maem.  
Thebe were furthered by the death of Stalin. The succw 
of the Chinese together with the North Koreans in blwk- 
ing American military power demonstrated in the mmt 
vivid way how drastically the balance of power has shiPted. 
This objective weakening of the capitalist structue alw 
objectively weakened the Soviet bumaucracy as a WrgeOh 
growth upon the workers state stmcture. Tito'e suc&ssfd 
&aIlenge mrm already an intimatim of thii. Thue pmfsely 
when the power of the bureancracy seemed st its pimale, 
with vast new territories and populations brought und- 
its domain, its fatal internal wealmeas was mvded. The 
R W n  Revolution, heaving up again from the depths, has 
begun to break the bureaucratic crud. 
In foreign policy, Khmshchev & Cu. did no$ mak% 
any concessions whatsoever t b t  could be interpreted as a 
return to Lenin's policy of revolutioraay smislism. h f& 
they openly revised hliin, dalaring that imperialist war 
on the Soviet Unim is no bnger inevitable and thet m 
cialism can be achieved in capitalist -tries & l a g  Iptrhtly 
pnrrlim~entary paths. These revhima simM 
in the foreign policy followed by Stirlfa In fact, aa d i p b  
matie fomulatiolu, they sewed to give notice to the 
Western powers that the dogsa of a rdm to b i n  was 
d e e d  to  meet domeith pmmms. The red&- were 
cahlsted prInnarily as mtwusantm b the c~tpMist 
sateemen that no return +o W n  h envhged for the 
fomiepl Cornmunitat Partieis even gartidy or as depna~ogy 
for mnk and file comumption. 
FReSH BmRAYAlS 
At the m e  t i e  the announcement d these m*ms 
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I wm,ddgmd to fmjlibte new fkiwh be&Ws o f . I m i h  
by the CimmnM Mi%s &mad. Ywmw views Mwh 
betray* J a war of hdphg to seam a ded with the 
W d m ~  Powem. As In the time of Sblia, the -1in 
means by '-1 c o e & t a ~ ~ "  a m t s t ~ ~  policy with 
irnperkhn of live md kt Eve, or m n t d  mietame in 
putting down, dei l ing  and heading off revolutionary 
movepnefits of the workers and colonial peog1as. The presea~t 
plicy of the Communist Party of Frmce in aupprt-ing the 
m c h  imperialist government agajnst the insurgent 
North Africans is s w e  is golnt. Aaother example is the 
policy of the U.S. Co~aambt Party in supporting the 
Democmtic Party and attempting to head off all mwes 
of the wotking class towand independent ~olitica2 action. 
The attempt by qmkemen bf American imperialism 
malce but the end of the Stdin CUR as due t o  p ~ r &  
from abroad is thus fahe the core. The impsrialisb 
never had any trouble in getting dong with SMh. Theg 
even d 8 t d  him in hMing I@ the dt when it suited 
thkir pu-. The W d  Dem- likewise never found 
the cult am o b W e  to a b n a a  and &ittons with the 
Stalinists. The acceptabflity of Stdhhn to both im- 
pwidhta and Whl Danoopata d d n g  the past 30 sears 
la actually additional pxlooi that the deckion t o  smash the 
cult waa due to ink& p r e w m  that threaten the ruk 
of the bureaumy, 
That these premureks are prdetadan in character is 
vTsmonstrated by the &npIe fact h t  what the bumucrata 
v i s e  in braking .wp the ShHn mlt is a return to hnim. 
This is the mwt popular pro& they could mke, the 
praPlise best mlculaed t o  amatre the fmes moving 
k 
d n s t  the Gureamw. A retaw to W i n  meam keeping 
the planned economy bat fistodng tIse workera dmocna@ 
+bat &kd in Leah's time. The glogan "Brack to  Lain!" 
i# thtu a proletarian s l w n  which the m a w  will inevric 
t d y  fill PPf& their own lfevoIubhnary d d h t  content. 
N d n d y ,  thb will nolt occur in a day. The ~~ 
are 8s yet unorg-. The b u m m y  wiU fight 
deqx&dy aa it near# itrt down. The entire will 
have its ups and dbms and even reversale. The important 
thing is that the mas ha0 began and in the f'inal 
analydii it will prove to be hibThh. 
'COLLECTIVE LEAOERSH lY 
The bureaucmtle t q m  me d u g  to pmmt a d i d  
h n t  whidr they d l  u c & d ~ a  leadenshfp." hope 
to hbfl iee  their emjoyrnant of special privileges, to d 
the unmhhty  md fear that existed ih their own m h  
under Stdlh's pwge a m .  But at the Twentieth Con- 
m a  itself nu-s in *e "dlectMty" were obemle .  
These can be e& to d e q m  and to be mflected ammg 
Stalidsit bnmucrats abroad as the nuwa prmture takes 
mom! d h t  and apn foms, The wedming positim of 
the hreaucracy win, rn in the case of all other similar 
formatiam in history, manif& I b l f  in sharpening in- 
ternal diffmcea in which m e  bureammt~ cae3 be ex- 
pected ta cast their lot with the moIutIonary movemeat 
of the workers. Such splits, of come, are of mbordi~sate 
hprhnce to the appearambe of revolutionary oumh 
among the Soviet workem and the rank of the Cm- 
manisit P&y. 
Differences in the bn~eaucraep will tend to break out 
at specific points invdving what limits should be set to the 
c o ~ m s h n a .  Emh new concemian will cause fmh hmm 
among the bum-tic m. 
Each new revelation constitute9 a fresh indictment 
of thdr share in Stalin's crimes. The crimes go back to 
1923 and M u d e  the mashing of the Left Oppdtion, the 
mashing of work- d e m y ,  the slaughter of him's 
entire generation of Bvlahevik-s, the mzlrder of milLions 
of -I, the establiahmemt d dave labar camps, the 
&mpiMion of the Red Asmy on the eve of war, reliame 
'm the Win-Hi& psct to saf& the Soviet Union, 
the uerelw mcrifice of millions of soldim, the wrecking 
of scientific hstihtmm, pilhging of Soviet b a n e ,  re- 
gesM blood pugm of .the working drss, hpoeition of 
Wtar ian r e g h a  on the satellib mbtries, the smash- * of the Communist 1n.ternstianal and murder of work- 
i q & s  leadem abroad, the behyaI of one revalytioa 
after mother beginning with the Chi= Revdution af 
19Z&-Z7, the German Revduthn that could have ~ e l a q d  
the rise of Hitler, the Spanbh Itsvohrti~n that c o d  have 
b M  Frmco, rrnd emling *th the betrayal of the great 
&war mvolutionary upheavale in France a d  Italy. 
Ehmddev & Ca will not willingly admit their guilt in 
t h e  crimes, 
end of b b  spda l  prid 
haseofthe b- 
the W& U n h  is akin b a d i n g  dam, The bash con- 
fMct k M g e p  the e e d  m u -  am? khe work 
'I i ~ c k w h i c h l a m d d n g k m d m w i t .  
~ ~ h c h e t r  & Ca are d thii, for they 
cuotwwnpanid their t b l m e i a h  of S& with p i -  for I 
hls pwms ob TmbkyWa md 0th mdtionhthl, They . am &temp&w to 5- the BOLT~Y yeam uf Stdin's mle ' whea the cult was mhblbhd and *e hmucracy corn 
wlidated its rule. And Pmwh hag a h d y  begun de31mo- 
hg "&ten elem- - that i ~ ,  m k m s  and theh 
sp&eam83t who matt to carny the ending & the Stalin 
cult beyond thentlmrwhih wiW.which the buren'~~cmcy 
would like to keep ft. By bringing the dead S t a b  partially 
to j u a h  for his mawbus &me% &mea that w e e  
ream due to the entire e~rstem of hrapcratk rule, 
Stalin'a heirs hape to retain this amtern which they 
helped SWin W i a h  and which they now head. ThL I 
d m  wta the ultimate lirnas to the m c ~ ~  Chey 4 1  
grant. 
Thus in c w d b g  to the rn- on the S u n  cult, the 
bumauc~acy will find Wlf in a war* prdicament. Tak- 
ing bhia c o a c ~ 5 O S  with did a d  joy, the mams wilI 
ae~nad more. Esah new ~~ will further heighten 
the eeli-~onfidmae of 4he m a w s  and bring do;eer the 
dddve  poht where g d t h U  mlation ~ a a r  Imdc out in 
t h e S o v i w t U n f o n . A n ~ b y t h e ~ ~ t o t x l m  I 
I baek M W  the tlu d =mgS - 0 ~ ~ 8  EIA hl Stda1h'~ 
time can pwipihte the aoming poutid rwdutioat that. 
will overthrow w w i l e  Thus & t k  co- nor 
can loqg &hy the WvW mass~ds Srozu once 
will. The I w a r e a w  faces a d a d i & o n  it carno+ 
The bureweracy ha9 no internth of rehabilitating 
TWsky or of permitting the Soviet pu& to read hb 
worka. Yet d q i t e  their htediom9, 'ProWy'~ gmat ehz- 
d e  in defense of the conquests d the Ruadm Reddm 
against Stalinist degemmtip11 is being vindicated point 
by point. Ad1 thwe h e s  that dto haw receded 
into history are now being reviewed by world pubM 
opinim 88 if they wwe freeh living WCmk Thm fs what 
always happens when the tmth mtehea up with the lie. 
The historid review h a m e  Jmvi-taMe once the 
Kremlin began admitting the frame-ups sf the find yesa?s 
of SWn'a rule* M y ,  In hying to appem the W e t  
people who suffered m e  40,000,000 d h ~  h World 
War IT, they have been fomd to go back to the key pdd 
of the infamous Mhmw Fkame-up Wla. The mnfdoa 
that TukhachevW and the uthw R%d Amy plus 
some 6,000 o f f b ,  w t m  damghw by $Win in a 
frame-up d i m m i  whwt lrroltrsky said at the t h e .  Tha 
confession about the fearful costa of SWi'e policy to the 
defew of the SaPiet Unim mfims one of TrobWs 
raah charga agdhat Qtulin. In face orf m h  admi- 
the vedict of the Dewey CoamMon in 1987 that XRan 
Trohky and Lew Sedw wem immemt of the dmga 
1welM by Stah and that the M m m ~  Wah fram+ 
u p ~  gdna fresh fom. 
In the Sdet  Unlm ibeli, tbe whle etrwture od 
slanders against h.otskp mast mmbb along with f ie 
phter shkrea of SWia that am MYW being hammered 
to m d e r .  The tmth will begin to s p s a  anwng the 
maam h w t  Tmtukfs -big the iiFift fhyear  a, 
advocating i n d u ~ d h t i o n  again& StalIn's cqqmItfon, 
coll&ividion the Sblin-Bukbdn bloc, f d e d y  
alliame ~ 5 t h  *e peaeitnhy, balsmd pwddion d h w  
d conarmera mmI.43, ml&aatbn bbbo.oad of Lah'iB 
policy of Furthering the w d d  m?m,Inldm m apaM 
Sbk'a pdky ob blocking it ~IEder m k  oi bulldiqr 
" d d h  h one caanky." TKIbky will emerge aa the 
mvdutimary socialist hero who j o W  Lenin in 1928 in 
T - 
'I 
bednning the fight a % a h k  ShWism W w b 1 . w  
true to that straggle wtil he was s h c k  down by W n ' d  
pick-axe, 
Thia is certt& to ha- beam the warkern 
with their a o c i a ~  d o n m m  mil not IJ+ qatidikd 
' with the explanation that Stab's crimes were due, .to his 
I r paranoic aberrations. In dumping the cult which ascribed a11 good in the Soviet Union t o  Stalin's re-rkable per- sonality, the bureaucracy will not succeed in turning the 
cult ilrto its oppite ,  ascribing all the evils d bureaucratic 
i 
.m!e to Stalin's villainow pmanality. From the Marxist 
' outlook, how can it be explained that a blod-thirety 
hmatic muld become persod dictstor in the Soviet Union? 
This question must loom large right now in the USSR. 
.Marxism demands an analysis of the social forces making 
such a phenomenon possible. Trotakylstn bas already 
provided that analysis just as Trotskyism is now providing 
the Marxist amlysis of the social forces bringing an end 
to the cult of this dm. Soviet Mamists ammg the 
mmses, whose names we do not yet h o w ,  are surely 
making their own indqxdmt analysis, demonstrating 
that the dqpmwtion of the Bwasian h l u t i o n  was due 
to the formation of o pamaitit c a ~ t e  which put Stalin In 
power* When their vobs  are heard they will prove ta be 
the v o k  d Rwkn Trohkyisrn, the leaders of the 
regemding R u a a h  Bevolutim. 
Since Stdm uaurped power, the Soviet Union survived 
the pressrare of e m h l h g  capitdiarn thank t o  the power 
of planned economy. The new w y  f o m  esWshed 
by the Bolshevik Pmty uuder k n i n  and Tmtsky mved  
inmnqmmbly more powerful than even the foundem of the 
WIet Union with all their great corrifdace dreamed. 
w t e  Stalinist degemation and mbmanngma+, 
pbned emmmy brought the M e t  Union v M r y  in 
World War IZ against the full weigM of Gmnan  imperial^ 
b, the (30ngu-r d the & b t .  M the 
w e a h  of C d s t  R d a ,  this cornby has anaged as 
the -Md most pow&Iul in the wozId, the only one out- 
side the Uni.ted States capable of dweIoping atomic energy 
out' of its own m o w .  The imew forms have 
pmved even more powerful than the S W s t  degeneration, 
for the Stalini~ts themelves de@h their own internti 
w m  forced to extend .them by mititaw hmsucratic 
29 
THE CONSCIOUS FACTOR 
This long and painful stage is now cios~mg. The con- 
&us factor is coming to the fore. It is visible in the 
pressure the masses are exerting upan the burenucratcy. 
Revdutionary eoneciwaneaer is moving toward reasseding 
ihi rightful rule in the Soviet Union. When this occurs 
revolutionary socialism will appear once again an a world 
scale - if this has not happened already by then - in 
the form of mas3 polrties as it did in the early years of 
the Communist International. This time the power of 
mcialist consciousness will prove to be decisive in the 
struggle to replace capitalism with the superior order of 
socialism. 
The end of the StaIin ouIt h a mt victory for 
revolu.timary socialism. No worse mistake could be made 
than to dismiss or underestimate the significance of this 
event, The verdict of the impartial Dewey Commission 
discredited Stalin in the eyes of informed public opinion. 
The verdict of the very partial bureaucracy discredits 
S t a h  among the rank and file of the Communist Parties 
throughout the world, This opens up wholly new perspec- 
tives for removiw the obatacle of Stalinism and bringing 
the Trotskykt program to the workers whose minds are 
now being freed of the Stalin cult. 
Trotskyist works now acquire burning actuality, with 
fresh facts pouring in every day to confirm our entire 
wition on the Soviet Union. In historic perspective our 
movement is seen to have been preparing for this great 
turn since the days of the Left Opposition when Trotsky 
first organized the struggle against Stalin. 
In contrast, the entire StaIinist movement, large and 
powerful as it is, finds itself in utter confusion, and con- 
sternation. What doesn't it have to revise in its ideology? 
What book does it have that must not be converted into 
pulp? W h t  pamphlet even? All its histories must be 
rewritten and the new ones will remain suspect so Img 
a they attack Trotskyism. All the resdutions and 
pronomements must be scrapped, the entire education 
of the rank mil file admitted to be lortdad with lies and 
pervBFSim d the truth. 
None of the groups in t h e  Stmlinist periphery can 
escape these devastating c r n t q u e n c e ~ ~  What are the 1 
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s ~ o f b o a P s t s a b o l l a t ~ & ~ ~ t o ~ -  
I paramie M e r .  
Tbow & r c b  w b o p m ~ b o ~ ' ~ ~ &  ob 
Stdinism but who alway~ m a w  C 
t h e p w g w a a d f r m t + u g m & n d f a b ~ m ~  
seen for what they are - either 5 
d~ apologbts for bhe fiendish mimes of 8 
Imm the Terrihh. 
VICTORY FOR MARXIST THEORY 
.+ 
The groupa hem md there who decided a t  TWa& 
ism hadlwextbyqnmsd by hIstclwymithat the waved 
the future helm to SUniem are now amfounded by 
mch fresh c ~ i o n  d i n g  the world's *tuntion to tha 
fa& that Tmbkyism was the d y  f o m  that told the 
tmth about Stabkm. The politics of betmyd mmwt8 
down for these gmum ta vying with the womt Stdiniat - 
hacks In providing rathnalimtim for the bureammy, 
painting up the d m &  &&s at rehabilibtion in face 
of the nww gmam ae "self&'" of the b ~ u ~ y .  
Deukherim, which lea- oat the hviet  mmcm aa if 
the bufeaucmcy were a mtionat nutmamaus power, Cum 
at to be the i'deobgy be& dted  to aasekt the detmgoggr 
of the Khwhchm 
' - Ammg the vicbEtrs that the end of the Stalk cult 
'gives Tmtskyhn in the field of theory, two are oub 
standing. The contention that Stalinism was the logical 
mtinuatim of ldnim him now been repudiated by ite 
originators, Sun ' s  own handqkked politid gangstem. 
They are famed to c d w s  what Trotsky insisted wpm 
fmm the  be^^, tlutt Stalim was not the cantimator 
of b i n  but hia e k e .  The ideologues who 
also tried to make out t h t  Wnim n the con.tiaUatioll 
of b n h h  are not much better Off. To exgEain why 
Stdim haa been dumped and the bamer of h n i o  d e d  I again, must -sin tbe d i f f e m  Mweetl  fie two. 
Rather than do Wi they have for iibe preeeat dewred 
(to maintain a d i m e t  silence h t  the subject. 
I The other theory that ha8 been Wt a m o h l  blow 
by the new stage of the Ruasim Rew,Mom m w  olpesriag 
up fa Ubun?aUmik OdMiVbWn." -Sag to this t h r y ,  
planned economy upm supemding ca.pitaIbm b m a i  the 
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em-,* far a new tym of ruling dm neyer More 
seen b history, a "bureacucratic collect@e'! that exploits 
the working dam thmgh its control of the state. This 
view is a revision of the basic theoretical structure of 
Marxism, inasmuch as Marxism puts planned economy - 
in its full, rational development - as the essential and 
sufficient economic requisit'e for the coming da 
mciety. 
Planned economy has the capacity ;o elimina 
scarcity that nourished a11 previous cIass formations. The 
Soviet economy was confined to one country, and hamper4 
and distorted in its devslopme.nt by a bureaucratic caste 
formation, paras! tic in character. The caste, enjoying 
bou.rgeois privileges, represented the tendency towad 
restoration of capitalism. The caste is basically alien to 
planned economy and not, as the bureaucratic collectivist 
theory holds, inherent to it. It is parasitic and not ex- . 
ploitative. Therefore the caste lacks the stability of a 
true ruling class. 
THE HYPNOSIS IS BROKEN 
Trotsky maintained that in the Soviet L'nh the 
development of planned economy, as it reveal& its enor- 
moue potentialities and heightened the indwtrial level at 
a new a d  unprecedented rate, would undermine the caste 
- not strengthen it - and create the +necessary economic 
and social conditions for iks overthrol3b: He predicted that 
the f urthef development of Soviet planned economy would, 
therefore, be amampanid by inereasingl$* severe mani- 
festationa of the basic instability of the bureaucracy's mle. 
Trotsky's Marxist podtion has now received the moat 
powerful confirmation as against the novel theory of 
bureaucratic collectivism, for the first stirrinm of' the 
Soviet working class in the new stage of the Russian 
Revdution shook down the central ideology which had 
bound the bureaucracy together for three decades. More- 
over, the burm~cmta themelves were forced to confess 
to the preamiouaness of their positiona under Stalin, thus 
adding grapbic testimony to the instability of the caste% 
place in Soviet suiiety. 
Trotsky'% defense of the Soviet Union aga 
perialism haa likewise received the most powerful -ton- 
firmation as amid the defeatist line of the hreaucratic 
coll~etivists and others of similar views. It was 
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self-confidence of the Soviet m k e r s ,  g h e d  through their 
victory in World War I& the consequent exten3bm of state 
ownerahip and planning Into Eastern Europe and the vice , , tory of the Chinese revohtioa, that resulted in today'a - 
demolition of the Stdin cult as a harb'ier of the over- 
throb of the bureaucracy and t he restoration d demmtic 
workerg rule. 
The entire StaIinbt movement has been hit by the 
moat profund ideological erisis since its origin. The 
sacred Kremlin texts have been thrown into the ash can. 
The Stalinist parties are in a state of shock. The hypnosis 
that dosed the eyes and ears of the ShIinist rank and file I 
has %en hoken. They are now compelled to think. They 
are beginning to ask searching questions. Many of them, 
it is true, eqmially the older generation will drop aside 
in demoralization. The cynical hard core *l continue to  I 
serve the new Kremlin masters as they did the old. The 
Stalinist youth, however, will grove increasingly wWng 
to dfgcuas with Tratskykts and the best of them can. be 
won over to revdutimmry socialism. Already, with deep 
shame, they am droppbg the epithets they were taught 
to uae like robots in referring to Trotskyists such as "Bit- * 
lerite agents," "fhckt mad dogs," "cohorts of the Titoite 
scum," and so oa. All the elements are present far profound - 
differentiations within the boasted monolithism of the 
Stalinist machine. In countries such ax France and Italy, 
where mt mass Communist Parties exist and where the 
Stalinist bureaucmts are going t!, new lengtbe in ,wpport- 
ing the imperialist government, the opportunities are 
especially favorable. 
SElZE THE OPPORTUNITY! 
To make thwe oppmtmities, however, requires the 
utmod attention on the part d the Trotskyists. Aloofnws 
to thk work would be steriIe sectarianism. We have 
prepared far this for more than 26 y e w .  Now we must 
move in, arrd move energetically. Campaign methods m u d  
be used to bring the rnetxage of Trubkyism to m k  and 
file Cmmuniat Party membem. Our prw must turn full 
attention b this task, attentively following the develop 
m a t s  in the new ~tage d the Rumiam Repo1uticm and 
mkii sure that the Marxist -tation is cmistentlp' 
brought to the attention cf the Communist Party rank 
aad file. ThL means that they muat be pzrsistantly sought 
otrt, their &-ion died to pamplrleta and book8 in orrr 
r Q e h a m e d e k t c i ~ t h e e v e n b o i t h e ~ t t h t a r e  
warbeingretilvedhtbeworMpmmamdkt%emmchwb 
neea of dliolls as Win's victims am mhabl3i4u.led. Tfre 
~ u d s t ~ m a k d P i l e c a n a a h d m n s t b e m s d e t o  
know the truth b u t  Trohks's ak.uggIe stgainst 
T h q  can 8nd muat be b g h t  tb h t h  &art the -born 
flght Ox the lbrth Internth1 b keqi dive the bd i -  
~ m f ~  
This camdga mu& not be vbmd as a &orb- 
pmpdtim but as a suatafaed e&d, p r h d y  ducatha1 
in dumcter. The objective mud be ta w h  CommmW 
Par tywto thegro l~x 'amof  TdxWmnwithcutQ~e 
slight& ihsbm a h &  m f e  the mmtub that hae 
been Mi  for mom than a quarter of a cenhry. Same, 
it is true, will rn all the way in repudiating Stslidam. 
Rut ma& d this appamhs, their hmda dripping with the 
Muad they helped Stalh epN, will wner ur later depart 
f b m  the na diecreditmi, rre ckpised and aa hatd am 
the nmk they mmd. But the rank and file rnmbmi 
who joined the cmnmunbt Party b u m  they thought it 
wm genuindy revdutionarfr wdl dmw the bit* hsm 
d their experience and m e  key cad mi^ in the 
mmbling d fm now d e  poereible by the dath  of the 
s u m  cult. 
The gmat v k h y  wan by world TdsWsizn ehmH 
erne to impire the emtire naweanerrt to fabw ap in the 
amst a m x i  way. The R u s h  RerrroIu&bn by- mddy 
push* over the S U  idd aad forcing o- frr#n 
SWhpe h w  hsra -in proved its vitaHty. We nwst now 
prove ovraelves m@Ie of eeizing the -fee it 
opens up for revdutiomry d l i a r P n  fn other lade. Th& 
ia the kt way to help the Soviet e r a  aa they mme 
0- h rr final settling of accwnts d h  the Stalinist -. 
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